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BANKRUPTCY-THE ESTATE:
THE DISTRICT COURT FOR NORTH DAKOTA DETERMINES
THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS IN ORDER FOR AN EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS PLAN TO BE ERISA-QUALIFIED AND
EXCLUDED FROM THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE
In re Craig, 204 B.R. 756 (D.N.D. 1997)
I. FACTS
In 1976, James M. Craig, doing business as a Montana professional
corporation, executed both pension and profit-sharing plans (Plans) and
accompanying trust agreements.' Craig signed the agreements as presi-
dent of the employer corporation and trustee of the Plans. 2 From the
time the Plans were created until 1986, there were other employee-
participants in the Plans, including Craig's ex-wife. 3 Sometime after
1986, the professional corporation ceased business and was involuntarily
dissolved.4 At the time the professional corporation ceased business, the
participants' interests in the Plans vested and Craig, as trustee, paid out
the assets of all participants, with the exception of his own and his ex-
wife's.5 No further contributions were made to the Plans and the Plans
have since become "wasting" or "frozen" plans. 6
1. See In re Craig, 204 B.R. 750, 752 (D.N.D. 1996) [hereinafter Craig 1] (illustrating that Craig
was the sole shareholder of the professional corporation, James M. Craig, M.D., P.C.).
2. Id.
3. See id. (stating that the other employee participants included in the plan were bookkeepers and
nurses).
4. See id. (stating that a certificate of fact from the Montana Secretary of State indicates that
James M. Craig, M.D., P.C. was involuntarily dissolved on December 12, 1988; Craig has since done
business as a sole proprietor). Jon Strinden, an attorney hired by Kip Kaler to assist with the appeal,
stated that "the dissolution of [Craig's] corporation is an important fact because at [that] point there
was no longer a plan sponsor for the retirement plan, [and] in the absence of a plan sponsor, you can
no longer have an ERISA-qualified plan." Letter from Jon E. Strinden, Attorney, Gunhus, Grinell,
Klinger, Swenson & Guy, Ltd., to Amy Dahl, Staff Member, North Dakota Law Review (Nov. 7, 1997)
(on file with author).
5. See Craig 1, 204 B.R. at 752 (citing Craig's testimony at trial); see also id. at 752 n. I (confirm-
ing this testimony by citing to § 8.03 of both plan documents which provides that "[i]n the event of
permanent discontinuance of Contributions to the Plan by the Employer, the accounts of all vested and
nonforfeitable to such Members to the extent funded"). Subsequently, in 1991, Craig and his wife
were divorced and the divorce decree awarded Craig's ex-wife one-half of his interest in the Plans.
See id. (citing again to Craig's testimony). This interest awarded to Craig's ex-wife by the divorce
decree was distinct from her own interest as an employee-participant in the plan, and was never paid
out. Id. at 752 n.2.
6. Id. A plan becomes a "wasting" or "frozen" plan when, due to inability to satisfy all of the
benefit commitments of the plan, an employer (or plan sponsor) amends the plan and ceases the
"crediting of future service for benefit accruals." 51 Fed. Reg. 12492 (1986). It is important to note
that with regard to ERISA plans, ERISA requires notification to the participants and beneficiaries of
the plan by the plan administrator before any significant reduction in the benefit accruals (including
the freezing of such accruals) is made. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(h) (1994).
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The Plans were not promptly amended to comply with the 1984
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) amendments, and Internal Revenue Service
5500 forms were not filed for the Plans for a number of years. 7 Craig
executed amendments to the Plan documents in 1995, but never
withdrew or altered the status of the Plan assets.8
Craig filed for Chapter Seven bankruptcy in the District of North
Dakota on May 1, 1995.9 Craig's "Schedule of Property Claimed as
Exempt" initially sought to exempt the Plans from the bankruptcy estate
under North Dakota Century Code section 28-22-19(1).10 The bank-
ruptcy trustee objected to this claim of exemption and the schedules
were subsequently amended."I The amendment asserts that the Plans are
"qualified plans not property of the estate" under the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Patterson v. Shumate.12 It is the assertion
of this amendment, the claim the Plans are not property of the estate,
which has been the focus of the appealed orders.13
7. In re Craig, 204 B.R. 756, 757 (D.N.D. 1997) [hereinafter Craig 11].
8. Id.; see also Craig 1, 204 B.R. at 752 (stating that Craig had executed the 1995 amendments to
the Plans in preparation for filing bankruptcy). The Plans were amended by documents titled "Pension
Plan and Profit Sharing Plan," dated January 31, 1995. Appellants Brief on Appeal at 5, Craig 11, 204
B.R. 756 (D.N.D. 1997) (No. 95-30415). Jon Strinden stated that "in the absence of a plan sponsor,"
due to the dissolution of Craig's professional corporation, "no one had the authority to amend the
retirement plan." Letter from Jon E. Strinden, supra note 4. Although Craig's plan "was amended and
signed on behalf of [his] professional corporation and submitted to the Internal Revenue Service,"
Strinden states that "[c]learly a corporation which had been dissolved approximately 10 years prior to
the amendment cannot enter into an amendment." Id.
9. Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 2, Craig 11 (No. 95-30415); Debtor's Reply to Appellant's Brief
on Appeal at 3. Craig 11, (No. 95-30415).
10. Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 2, Craig II (No. 95-30415). The Plans were listed on the
schedule as being worth $73,236.83. Id. The relevant portion of North Dakota Century Code section
28-22-19 states:
The following amounts are exempt from liability for debts of the person to or on account
of whom the amounts are paid, and are not subject to seizure upon execution or other
process:
(1) All pensions or annuities or retirement, disability, death, or other benefits
paid or payable by, or amounts received as a return of contributions and inter-
est from, a retirement system established pursuant to state law by the state.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-19(1) (Supp. 1995).
It seems peculiar that the Debtor would originally try to exempt the Plans under this exception
sinee the attoracy for .he debior, knowing that ERISA-quaiified plans were exempt from the bank-
ruptcy estate, asserted in his brief that before filing the case he had advised the debtor to contact the
person who had drafted the documents to make sure that the Plans were ERISA-qualified. Debtor's
Reply to Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 3, Craig 11 (No. 95-30415).
11. Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 2, Craig I (No. 95-30415); Debtor's Reply to Appellant's
Brief on Appeal at 3, Craig 11 (No. 95-30415).
12. Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 2, Craig 11 (No. 95-30415); Debtor's Reply to Appellant's
Brief on Appeal at 3-4, Craig II (No. 95-30415). See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 760 (1992)
(holding that ERISA qualified plans are excluded from the bankruptcy estate).
13. Craig!, 204 B.R. at 753 (addressing whether the Plans are subject to ERISA in order to be
ERISA-qualified and excluded from the bankruptcy estate under Shumate); Craig If, 204 B.R. at 757
(addressing the issue of whether the Plans are ERISA-qualified under Shumate).
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The first appealed order dealt generally with the issue of whether
Craig's interests in the Plans were excluded from the bankruptcy
estate. 14 The Plans would be excluded from the estate only if they were
subject to a transfer restriction enforceable under "applicable non-bank-
ruptcy law."15 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
qualifies as "applicable non-bankruptcy law," and therefore, if an
ERISA-qualified plan contains the requisite enforceable anti-alienation
or transfer restriction provision, the property is excluded from the
bankruptcy estate. 16
The bankruptcy court determined that Craig's Plans were not
ERISA-qualified because they were not subject to ERISA.17 The federal
district court for the District of North Dakota reversed that decision,
holding that Craig's Plans were subject to ERISA, and sent the case back
to the bankruptcy court to determine the issue of whether the Plans were
ERISA-qualified. 18
On remand, the bankruptcy court concluded that Craig's Plans were
ERISA-qualified, and therefore, excluded from the bankruptcy estate. 19
The district court held that in order for such plans to be ERISA-qualified
they need only contain anti-alienation provisions and be "subject to
ERISA," thus affirming the bankruptcy court's determination that
Craig's Plans were ERISA-qualified. 20
14. Craig 11, 204 B.R. at 757. The District Court has the authority to act as an appellate court in
reviewing bankruptcy court decisions. In re Muncrief, 900 F.2d 1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 1990).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1993).
16. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 758 (1992).
17. Craig I, 204 B.R. at 752. In its treatment of the case, the bankruptcy court discussed the
"1995 Plans" as distinct from the original "1976 Plans," and thus determined that the "1995 Plans"
were not subject to ERISA. Id.
18. Id. at 755. On appeal, the district court recognized that'a distinction must be made between
the plan documents, which may have changed due to the 1995 amendments, and the Plans themselves
(in other words, the assets accumulating under the Plans), which have not changed despite the 1995
amendments. Id. at 752. The court illustrated that if the 1995 amendments had any effect on the
Plans, they did so by amending or restating the Plans, not terminating the original Plans and creating
new Plans, as the bankruptcy court seemed to erroneously assume. Id. at 752-53. The result being, as
the district court acknowledged, that if the assets accumulated under the original Plans were
excludable from the bankruptcy estate before the 1995 amendments, they did not come into the estate
merely as a result of the amendments having been executed. Id. at 753. Thus, the district court
addressed the issue of whether the Plans are subject to ERISA with no distinction between the original
(1976) and amended (1995) Plans. Id.
19. Craig 11, 204 B.R. at 757.
20. Id. at 757, 760. The court stated that although it affirmed the 'decision of the bankruptcy
court, it did so on a separate legal basis. Id. at 757. The attorney for the Debtor stated that before
filing the bankruptcy case, he advised Craig to check with the drafter of the Plans to "make sure" that
the Plans were ERISA-qualified prior to the filing. Debtor's Reply to Appellant's Brief on Appeal at
3, Craig H (No. 95-30415). The attorney stated he knew that ERISA-qualified plans were not
property of the bankruptcy estate, and he believed that it would constitute malpractice to file a
bankruptcy case without checking to see if a debtor's Plans were "qualified" as such. Id.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Bankruptcy Code provides the rules and regulations to be used
in conjunction with the filing of bankruptcy. 21 Specifically, section 541
of the Bankruptcy Code defines the property of the bankruptcy estate
and specifies that Which becomes property of the estate. 22
The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate. 23 This
estate is comprised of all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property, wherever located. 24 The scope of this definition is broad and
all embracing, and the policy position behind this all-encompassing
determination of the estate is to ensure a broad inclusion of the assets in
the bankruptcy estate. 25
"Notwithstanding its broad scope," however, the Bankruptcy Code
does exclude certain interests in property from the bankruptcy estate. 26
The exclusion applicable to Craig's Plans is contained in section
541(c)(2). 27 This section states that "[a] restriction on the transfer of a
beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under appli-
cable non-bankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title." 28
Thus, a debtor's beneficial interest in a trust is excluded from the bank-
ruptcy estate so long as it is "subject to a transfer restriction enforceable
under 'applicable non-bankruptcy law."' 29 The policy behind preserv-
ing such restrictions, and therefore, keeping the property out of the
bankruptcy estate, is that such property is seen as "income reasonably
necessary for the support of a debtor and his dependents." 30
The elements required for property to be excluded from the
bankruptcy estate under the above stated statute are that it must first
contain an anti-alienation clause so as to restrict the "debtor's beneficial
interest;" and additionally, it must be enforceable under "applicable
21. See generally II U.S.C. §§ 101-541(1997) (articulating the rules and regulations governing
bankruptcy filings).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 541 Historical and Statutory Notes (1993).
23. Id.
24. Id. (citing II U.S.C. § 541(l)(a) (1993)). See also Whetzal v. Alderson, 32 F.3d 1302, !303
(8h Cir. 1994) (stating that the scope of § 541 is very broad and includes property of all descriptions,
tangible and intangible, as well as causes of action).
25. Id., see also In re Miller, 16 B.R. 790, 791 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982).
26. In re Hanes, 162 B.R. 733, 738 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994).
27. Craig 11, 204 B.R. 756, 757 (D.N.D. 1997).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1993).
29. Craig 11, 204 B.R. at 757 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2)).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) Historical and Statutory Notes (1993). But see id. (noting that subsec-
tion (c) generally, without the exception (c)(2), invalidates restrictions on the transfer of property of
the debtor, so that all of the interests of the debtor in property will become property of the estate;
additionally, the provisions invalidated are those that restrict or condition transfer of the debtor's
interest and those that are conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor, on the
commencement of a bankruptcy case, or on the appointment of a custodian of the debtor's property).
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non-bankruptcy law." 3l It has been determined that ERISA plans can
potentially fulfill such requirements.
32
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, generally
known and referred to as ERISA, was enacted by Congress in response to
the growth of private employee benefit plans in the United States. 33 The
purpose of this act was to "correct the perceived inadequacies of many
benefits plans, prevent employer abuses, and assure stability of bene-
fits." 34 Simply and practically speaking, the goal of Congress was to
protect pension benefits in order to ensure that "if a worker has been
promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement-and if he has
fulfilled whatever conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit-he
will actually receive it."35
The scope of ERISA is tremendously broad and extends to all
"employee benefit plans" established or maintained by employers or
employee organizations which affect commerce. 36 An "employee bene-
fit plan" is synonymous with an "employee pension benefit plan,"
which includes any plan "established or maintained by an employer...
to the extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding
circumstances ... provides retirement income to employees" or "results
in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the
termination of covered employment or beyond." 37 A plan is subject to
ERISA so long as it can be classified as an "employee benefit plan."38
ERISA imposes various requirements in order to protect the em-
ployees participating in such pension plans. 39 Of these requirements,
31. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 759 (1992). It is not enough, under section 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code, to merely require that pension plans include anti-alienation provisions, as section
541(c)(2) will only shield a beneficial interest in a trust when the anti-alienation provision is
enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy law. In re Hanes, 162 B.R. 733, 739 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1994).
32. Shumate, 504 U.S. at 760.
33. In re Conroy, 110 B.R. 492, 494-95 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
34. Id.
35. See Shumate, 504 U.S. at 764-65 (citing Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446
U.S. 359, 375 (1980)). In furtherance of this principle, the Supreme Court declined, notwithstanding
strong equitable considerations to the contrary, to recognize an implied exception to ERISA's
anti-alienation provision. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376
(1990). In reaching this decision, the Court reasoned:
Section 206(d) reflects a congressional policy choice, a decision to safeguard a stream
of income for pensioners (and their dependent, who may be, and perhaps usually are,
blameless), even if that decision prevents others from securing relief for the wrongs
done them. If exceptions to this policy are to be made, it is for Congress [and not the
Court] to undertake that task.
Id.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1985).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(a) (1985).
38. In re Hall, 151 B.R. 412, 417 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993).
39. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1309 (1985).
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two are particularly important with regard to Craig's Plans. 40 First,
ERISA states that "the assets of a plan shall never inure to the benefit of
any employer and shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing
benefits to participants in the plan . . "41 This requires that the assets
of a plan be used for the exclusive benefit of the employees.4 2 Ascer-
taining precisely who qualifies as an employee under this requirement
necessitates a comprehensive review of the defining concepts.43
Under this requirement, a "participant" is "any employee or for-
mer employee ... who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit...
from an employee benefit plan." 44  Additionally, an "employee," as
simply defined by ERISA, is "any individual employed by an employ-
er." 45  The Secretary of Labor has, however, pursuant to the authority
vested in that office to institute regulations necessary to the implemen-
tation of ERISA provisions, narrowed the definition of "employee
benefit plan" so that it must be used in accordance with the definition of
a "participant" in an ERISA plan. 46 An "employee benefit plan," has
come to be defined, therefore, as not including any plan where none of
the employees can be classified as "participants" under the plan. 47
Further, the Secretary of Labor's regulation directs that the term
"employees" does not include an individual or spouse if the business is
wholly owned by that individual or spouse or both.48 In conclusion, it is
mandatory that the plans in question have the appropriate eligible
"participants" and "employees" in order to be "employee benefit
plans" subject to ERISA.49
40. See Craig 1, 204 B.R. 750, 753 (D.N.D. 1996) (discussing who is eligible to be a "participant"
in the plan); see also Craig II, 204 B.R. 756, 759 (D.N.D. 1997) (discussing the tax benefits derived if
the plan is qualified under the IRC, and thus, articulating a purpose for such compliance).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (1985).
42. See Hall, 151 B.R. at 421 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(7) and 1103(c)(1) (1985)).
43. See id. at 420, 421; see also Craig 1, 204 B.R. at 753 (defining who qualifies as an employee
under this requirement).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1985). See Hall, 151 B.R. at 420 (suggesting that "[ricading these two
sections together establishes that for a plan to be subject to ERISA, it must exclusively provide benefits
to employees and former employees").
45. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (1985).
46. Hall, !151 B.R. at 420. e 2L
authority to promulgate such necessary regulations).
47. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(b) (1975).
48. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(c)(1) (1975). It has been determined, however, "that so long as there
are other 'employees' to bring the plan within the definition of an employee benefit plan, so as to be
covered by ERISA, then a sole shareholder and spouse ... can be participants in the plan." Craig I,
204 B.R. at 753 (citing Madonia v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., II F.3d 444, 449-50 (4th Cir.
1993)). In Craig's case, therefore, "[i]f Craig and his ex-wife were eligible to participate when there
were other employees, they should still be eligible to participate even though the other employees'
interests have been paid out." Id. at 755.
49. See Craig 4 204 B.R. at 755 (stating that a plan is "not subject to ERISA" if it does not have
the proper employee participants).
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The second requirement imposed by ERISA, with particular impor-
tance to the case at hand, is the condition that the plan must include a
restriction on the assignment or alienation of the plan, otherwise known
as an anti-alienation provision. 50 This anti-alienation provision is not
only essential in order to comply with ERISA requirements, but also
enables employers and employees alike to qualify for tax benefits under
the plan. 51 Most importantly, however, it is this anti-alienation provision,
as required by ERISA, which facilitates the union of ERISA and the
Bankruptcy Code.52
The issue that effectively incorporates ERISA and the Bankruptcy
Code is whether "non-applicable bankruptcy law," as stated under sec-
tion 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, applies only to state spendthrift
law or whether it also includes federal law. 53 More specifically, the issue
is whether ERISA-qualified plans could satisfy the literal terms of the
Bankruptcy Code.54 These issues were resolved by the Supreme Court in
Patterson v. Shumate.55
The Court determined that the natural language of the Bankruptcy
Code provision allows a debtor to exclude from the estate any interest in
a plan, so long as it contains a transfer restriction enforceable under any
relevant non-bankruptcy law. 56 The Court found nothing in the strict
reading of the provision that placed a limitation on the source of law
included in the provision. 57 Based on the notion that the Court must
enforce a statute according to its terms, plainly read, the Court found that
section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code "encompasses any relevant
non-bankruptcy law," including ERISA.58
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1974).
51. See In re Conroy, 110 B.R. 492, 495 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990) (stating that in order to encour-
age compliance, ERISA amended the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to provide tax benefits to both
employers and employees). Qualifying for those benefits requires much more than the mere inclusion
of an anti-alienation provision, however, as such qualification requirements have been described as
scaling a "legal mountain" of numerous IRC provisions. Hall, 151 B.R. at 418 n.15.
52. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1992).
53. See id. at 757-59 (discussing whether "non-applicable bankruptcy law" includes federal as
well as state law).
54. Id. at 759.
55. Id. at 759-60. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in this case, the courts of appeal were
divided on this question. See id. at 757 n.I. The Court determined in addressing this issue that the
requisite basis for their decision should be the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA. Id.
at 757 (citing Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 160 (1991)). The Court recognized that while it could
"appropriately ... refer to a statute's legislative history to resolve statutory ambiguity," the statutory
language at issue in this case "obviates the need for any such inquiry." Id. at 761 (citing Toibb, 501
U.S. at 162). This decision was rendered by the Court despite attempts by Petitioner to introduce
statutory history to get to the intent of the statute. Id. at 761-62.
56. Id. at 758.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 759. The Court justified this decision, beyond the plain language interpretation, by
identifying that Congress has frequently, when such meaning was desired, restricted the scope of
applicable law to state law. Id. at 758. It follows, therefore, "[that] Congress' decision to use the
1998]
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After making the determination that ERISA was included under
"applicable bankruptcy law," the Court further addressed whether the
anti-alienation provisions of ERISA plans would satisfy the "literal
terms" of section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.59 Again deferring
to the plain language of the statute in order to decide the issue, the Court
first looked to section 206(d)(1) of ERISA.60 This section states that
"[e]ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan
may not be assigned or alienated." 6 1 The Court determined, therefore,
that this language proves to literally satisfy the terms of section 541
(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code because it clearly imposes a "restriction
on the transfer" of a debtor's "beneficial interest" in the trust.62
Additionally, the language of ERISA prohibiting a plan from being
assigned or alienated is "enforceable," as required by section 541(c)(2)
of the Bankruptcy Code, and therefore, satisfies the literal language of
this section. 63 Such restrictions on alienability are enforced because plan
trustees are required under ERISA to discharge their duties "in accor-
dance with the documents and instruments governing the plan." 64 In
addition, "a plan participant, beneficiary, fiduciary, or the Secretary of
Labor may file a civil action to enjoin any act or practice which violates
either ERISA, or the specific terms of the plan," thus serving as a
mechanism of enforcement. 65 The Court concluded, therefore, that the
anti-alienation provision required for ERIS A-qualification "constitutes
an enforceable transfer restriction for purposes of section 541(c)(2)'s
exclusion of property from the bankruptcy estate." 66
broader phrase 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' [in this provision] strongly suggests that it did not
intend to restrict [this] provision.. " Id. Thus, "[r]eading the term 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' in
541(c)(2) to include federal as well as state law comports with other references in the Bankruptcy
Code to sources of law." Id. It had previously been decided by the Court that "a word is presumed to
have the same meaning in all subsections of the same statute," and thus it would follow that this
reference should not be limited to state law, but extended to include federal law. Morrison-Knudsen
Constr. Co. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 461 U.S. 624, 633 (1983).
59. Shumate, 504 U.S. at 759.
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1974)).
62. Shumate, 504 U.S. at 759 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1978)). Additionally, the Court
points out in this part of the opinion d--at L'he "coordinate section" of the IRC, 26 U.S.C. section
401(a)(13) "contains similar restrictions [on alienability]." Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1974)).
This is the language that comes to be referred to as "seemingly cryptic language" which the Hall court
uses to support the conclusion that "ERISA-qualified plans are tax qualified under the IRC, subject to
ERISA, and contain anti-alienation provisions." In re Hall, 151 B.R. 412, 419 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1993).
63. Shumate, 504 U.S. at 760.
64. Id. (citing to 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(d) (1974)).
65. Id. (citing to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) and (5) (1974)). Additionally, the Court points out that it,
in itself, has vigorously enforced ERISA's prohibition on the assignment or alienation of pension
benefits by declining to recognize any exceptions to the broad statutory bar. Id. (citing to Guidry v.




Shumate definitively linked the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA by
holding that because "applicable non-bankruptcy law" includes ERISA,
so long as there is an enforceable anti-alienation clause in an ERISA-
qualified plan, the property is excluded from the bankruptcy estate. 67 In
articulating this holding, the Court used, but failed to define, the term
ERISA-qualified, leaving lower courts to struggle with the interpretation
of what was intended by this term.68
The first cases to apply the decision reached in Shumate avoided the
necessity of interpreting what the Court intended by the term ERISA-
qualified by seemingly "assuming the existence of an ERISA-qualified
plan without discussion." 69 Judge Goodman, a justice presiding over the
Bankruptcy Court in Massachusetts, however, in analyzing Shumate with
respect to two cases he was hearing, "acknowledged [that] a determina-
tion may be necessary [to decide] whether a plan is ERISA-qualified
before excluding it from property of the estate." 70  Despite this
acknowledgment, neither of these cases reached the merits of ERISA-
qualification because the required evidentiary hearings had not been
held. 7 1 Following this recognition, however, decisions began focusing
on the meaning of ERISA-qualified, and whether a plan can be qualified
as such to bring it under the Shumate decision, rather than just assuming
the existence of ERISA-qualification without discussion. 72
Prior to discussing the two lines of cases, each establishing their
own interpretation of and test for the term of ERISA-qualified plans, it is
important to recognize a journal article written by J. Gordon Christy and
Sabrina Skeldon. 73 This article, cited by many post-Shumate cases,
asserts that the term ERISA-qualified plan is a construction of the
Supreme Court, because a definitive source for the term is non-
existent. 74 The authors of the article explore various sources that could
potentially provide a definition of what the Court intended by the term
67. Id. at 758-60. Additionally, this holding furthers the policy under ERISA of the uniform
national treatment of pension benefits. Id. at 765 (citing Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S.
1, 9 (1987)).
68. Craig II, 204 B.R. 756, 757-58 (D.N.D. 1997). See In re Hall, 151 B.R. 412, 417 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1993) (struggling to interpret "what is an ERISA-qualified plan"); see also In re Hanes,
162 B.R. 733, 739 (Bankr. E.D. Va.) (seeking to interpret the meaning of ERISA-qualified).
69. See Hall, 151 B.R. at 418 (citing to numerous cases which find that a plan is ERISA-qualified
without disputing or discussing this fact).
70. Id. at 418-19 (citing In re Sirois, 144 B.R. 12,14 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) and In re Greif, 144
B.R. 206, 208 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992)).
71. Id. Despite the fact that Judge Goodman did not reach this question on the merits, Hall sug-
gests that Sirois implies that an ERISA-qualified plan must be subject to ERISA, qualified under the
IRC, and contain an anti-alienation provision. Id. at 419 (citing Sirois, 144 B.R. at 14).
72. Id. at 418.
73. J. Gordon Christy and Sabrina Skeldon, Shumate and Pension Benefits in Bankruptcy, 2 J.
BANKR. L. & Pt c. 719 (1992) [hereinafter Christy & Skeldon].
74. Id. at 724-25.
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ERISA-qualified, only to find that this term is "[n]ot a term of art and is
not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, the IRC, or ERISA."75 Further-
more, "it is not even a term used by employee benefit practitioners." 76
This article, by stating that a definition for the term ERISA-qualified
plan is unavailable, has been utilized as a source to assure the lower
courts that they must interpret what the Court intended when using the
term ERISA-qualified plan. 77
Further, this article articulates suggestions as to what "the Supreme
Court may have intended by using the term ERISA-qualified plan." 78
The article suggests that the Court may have intended any of three
interpretations for the term. First, simply a plan "subject to ERISA."79
Second, a plan both subject to ERISA and containing an anti-alienation
clause. 80 Finally, a plan subject to ERISA, containing an anti-alienation
clause, and qualified under the IRC.81 It is exactly the second and third
possible interpretations of the Supreme Court, as suggested by this
article, that the two lines of cases addressing this issue adopt. 82
In re Hall83 is the leading case in the first line of cases to offer an
interpretation as to what is required in order for a plan to be classified as
ERISA-qualified. 84 The case establishes a three-part test, requiring that a
plan be subject to ERISA, contain an anti-alienation clause, and qualify
under IRC section 401(a) in order to be ERISA-qualified. 85
The Hall court, in rationalizing its interpretation, stated that the
"seemingly cryptic" language used by the Supreme Court in Shumate
supports this conclusion. 86 The court illustrated that the Supreme Court
in Shumate, when determining whether an anti-alienation provision of an
ERISA-qualified plan satisfied the literal terms of section 541(c)(2) of
the Bankruptcy Code, discussed that both ERISA and the IRC require








82. See In re Hall, 151 B.R. 412, 419 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993) (adopting the third interpretation
suggested by Christy and Skeldon); see also In re Hanes, 162 B.R. 733, 740 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994)
(adopting the second interpretation suggested by Christy and Skeldon).
83. 151 B.R. 412 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993).
84. Hall, 151 B.R. at 419 (articulating the elements the court determined necessary for a plan to
be classified as ERISA-qualified).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 759 (1992)).
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Supreme Court stated that the plan at issue in Shumate "complied with
these requirements."88
The Hall court concluded, therefore, that a reasonable reading of
this language requires that a plan "satisfy both the [IRC] and ERISA"
in order to be ERISA-qualified.89 The court reasoned that had the
Supreme Court not believed that the term ERISA-qualified include
qualifying for benefits under the tax code, the Court would not have
cited to the tax code and tax regulations. 90 From this analysis, therefore,
the Hall court adopted the three-part test with which a plan must comply
in order to be determined ERISA-qualified.91
A second line of cases, led by In re Hanes,92 declined to adopt the
decision and test of Hall.93 In rejecting the Hall test, the Hanes court
recognized that "different interpretations of [ERISA-qualified] may
lead to different consequences." 94 The Hanes court suggested that if
ERISA-qualified is interpreted to mean that a plan must satisfy both
ERISA and the IRC, then "creditors could reach the plan benefits if the
employer failed to amend to the plan to comply with a change in the tax
law." 95 Such an interpretation is not only contrary to the goals of
ERISA,96 but additionally, as the Hanes court pointed out, places too
much emphasis on the requirements of the IRC "while failing to place
sufficient emphasis on the Bankruptcy Code."' 97 For these reasons, the
Hanes court declined to adopt the IRC prong of the Hall test and instead
adopted a two-part test requiring that plans to be subject to ERISA and
88. Id. (citing to Shumate, 504 U.S. at 760) (emphasis added). It is important to note that Hall has
quoted the Supreme Court in Shumate as stating that "[the pension plan) complied with these
requirements." Hall, 151 B.R. at 419 (citing Shumate, 504 U.S. at 760). The actual language from the
Court in Shumate, however, states "[m]oreover, these transfer restrictions are 'enforceable,' as
required by section 541(c)(2)." Shumate, 504 U.S. at 760.
89. Hall, 151 B.R. at 419.
90. Id. It is important to note that the Hall case was decided in Michigan, and therefore, the
"Sixth Circuit authority regarding this issue must be carefully reviewed" in reaching a conclusion. Id.
The Hall court notes that one Sixth Circuit case had been decided regarding this issue, and that case
gave a "strong indication that the Sixth Circuit requires an ERISA-qualified plan" to be tax qualified
under the IRC, subject to ERISA, and include an anti-alienation provision. Id. (citing In re Lucas, 924
F.2d 597, 603 (6th Cir. 1991)). Given this information, the Hall court had incentive to reconcile
Shumate with the Sixth Circuit decision, and thus, was probably unable to look at Shumate objectively.
Additionally, although the Hall court adopts this three-part test to determine ERISA-qualification, it
was unable to apply all parts of the test, as the plan in that case was determined not to be "subject to
ERISA" because it was without employees. Id. at 421.
91. Id. at 419.
92. 162 B.R. 733 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994).
93. In re Hanes, 162 B.R. 733, 740 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994).
94. Id. at 739.
95. Id.
96. See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1992) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001(b) and (c)
(1974)). The goal of ERISA is to protect pension benefits, so that "if a worker has been promised a
defined pension benefit upon retirement ... he actually will receive it." Id. at 765 (citing Nachman
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980)).
97. Hanes, 162 B.R. at 740.
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contain an enforceable anti-alienation provision in order to be
ERISA-qualified.98
The Hanes court justified the rejection of the IRC prong of the
Hall test by revisiting the language in Shumate relied upon by the Hall
court. 99 The Hanes court indicated that "the references in Shumate
to the tax code simply acknowledge that [both] the tax code [and
ERISA] ...contain non-alienation provisions."100 Further, the court
articulated that it is "the presence of a non-alienation provision that is
important under section 541(c)(2) [of the Bankruptcy Code], and [only]
ERISA requires . . . and enforces [such provisions]."lOl Thus, by
illustrating that the Supreme Court's reference in Shumate to the IRC
was insignificant as to the interpretation of ERISA-qualified, the Hanes
court justified its rejection of the Hall test and the adoption of its own
two-part test. 102
The federal district court for the District of North Dakota "was not
squarely faced" with a decision between the three-part Hall test and the
two-part Hanes test in the first appeal of Craig's case. 103 The first appeal
dealt generally with the issue of whether Craig's Plans were subject to
ERISA.104 The bankruptcy court had determined that the Plans were not
subject to ERISA.105 The district court reversed that decision, however,
and remanded it to the bankruptcy court to determine whether the Plans
were ERISA-qualified.106
Despite the fact that the district court was not faced with the specific
issue of ERISA-qualification in the first appeal, statements made in that
decision go directly to this issue. 107 Particularly, the court determined
that the Plans were subject to ERISA and further stated that this
determination alone did not mean that the Plans were ERISA quali-
fied.108 Moreover, the court expressly stated that in order to be ERISA-






103. See Craig 11, 204 B.R. 756, 760 (D.N.D. 1997).
104. Craig 1, 204 B.R. 750, 753 (D.N.D. 1996).
105. id. at 752. The bankruptcy court determined that Craig's Plans were not subject to ERISA
due to a lack of eligible employee participants to bring the Plans into ERISA. Id. at 754.
106. Id. at 755. The court determined that if there are not presently eligible employee partici-
pants, so long as there were formerly eligible employee participants to bring the Plans into ERISA, the
Plans should remain subject to ERISA. Id.
107. See id.
108. Id. This statement by the court is important as it eliminates the first interpretation suggested
by Christy and Skeldon, that ERISA-qualified could mean, simply, a plan subject to ERISA. See
Christy & Skeldon, supra note 73, at 725.
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to an enforceable anti-alienation provision in the plan itself, and ...
must be qualified under the [IRC]."109 This test, as articulated by the
court, is the Hall test, and thus, the court implied that it would adopt this
interpretation of ERISA-qualified.ll0 It was not until the second appeal,
however, that the court actually examined this test and determined the
interpretation of ERISA-qualified it would ultimately adopt."'
III. ANALYSIS
In order to determine whether the bankruptcy court was correct in
its holding that Craig's Plans were ERISA-qualified, and excluded from
the bankruptcy estate, the district court for the District of North Dakota
first had to establish the elements a pension or profit sharing plan is
required to include in order to be classified as an ERISA-qualified
plan."l 2  The court began with a brief review of the manner by which
ERISA plans were originally established as property that could be
excluded from the bankruptcy estate.' 1 3
The court first looked to the Bankruptcy Code provision which
states that a debtor's beneficial interest in a trust is excluded from the
bankruptcy estate if it is subject to a transfer restriction enforceable
under "applicable non-bankruptcy law."114 The court then recognized
that the Supreme Court in Shumate established the link between ERISA
and the Bankruptcy Code by determining that "applicable non-bank-
ruptcy law" includes ERISA.II5
In articulating this holding, the Supreme Court utilized the term
"ERISA-qualified plan.""l 6  The district court found it difficult, how-
ever, to ascertain the specific meaning of the term "ERISA-qualified
plan" as intended by the Supreme Court.'1 7 First, the term "ERISA-
qualified plan" is unique, as it had not previously been used in
conjunction with the exclusion of ERISA plans from the bankruptcy
109. Craig 1, 204 B.R. at 755.
110. See In re Hall, 151 B.R. 412, 419 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993) (setting out the three-part test
to determine ERISA-qualification).
111. Craig 11, 204 B.R. 756, 760 (D.N.D. 1997).
112. See id. at 757 (illustrating that the dispute in this appeal has centered on the meaning of the
term ERISA-qualified).
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing II U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1993)).
115. Id. (citing Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 758 (1992)).
116. Shumate, 504 U.S. at 758.
117. See Craig II, 204 B.R. at 758 (citing Christy & Skeldon, supra note 73, at 724-25, which
states that the definition of ERISA-qualified is far from obvious); see also In re Hall, 151 B.R. 412, 418
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993) (citing Christy & Skeldon, supra note 73, at 725, where it is suggested that
the Supreme Court may have intended any one of three interpretations for the term ERISA-qualified
plan).
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estate.' 18 Additionally, the Supreme Court itself, although using the
term, did not and has not addressed what is required in order for a plan
to be ERISA qualified. 119 Thus, the district court was forced to deter-
mine the meaning of "ERISA-qualified plan" in order to properly
resolve whether Craig's Plans should be excluded from his bankruptcy
estate. 120
The court looked to two main sources for guidance in properly
interpreting what the Supreme Court intended by the term "ERISA-
qualified plan."121 First, the court followed the lead of numerous other
post-Shumate courts by looking to a bankruptcy journal article which
discusses the fact that there is no mention of the term "ERISA-qualified
plan" in the Bankruptcy Code, ERISA itself, or the Internal Revenue
Code.122 Further, the court looked to existing case law, specifically two
distinct lines of cases that have emerged with different interpretations of
the term "ERISA-qualified plan." 23
A. CHRISTY AND SKELDON JOURNAL ARTICLE
In trying to determine the meaning of the term ERISA-qualified
plan, the court first looked to the journal article written by J. Gordon
Christy and Sabrina Skeldon.124 This article has been cited in many
post-Shumate court opinions because it illustrates that the meaning of
the term cannot be ascertained from any of the conventional sources
utilized in dealing with ERISA plans.125
The article emphasizes that the meaning of the term ERISA-quali-
fied plan is far from obvious because "[it] is not a term of art and is not
defined in the Bankruptcy Code, the IRC, or ERISA."126 Generally,
when employee benefits practitioners speak of a "qualified plan," they
are referring to a "tax qualified plan" under the rules of the IRC.127
Additionally, the article demonstrates the incongruities of using the
term "qualified" in conjunction with ERISA, as plans do not "qualify"
118. Craig H, 204 B.R. at 758.
119. Id. at 757.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 758-60.
122. Id. at 758.
123. Id. at 758-60.
124. Id. at 758 (citing Christy & Skeldon, supra note 73, at 719).
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing Christy & Skeldon, supra note 73, at 724-25).
127. Id. (citing Christy & Skeldon, supra note 73, at 724-25). The reason that "qualified plan" is
usually synonymous with "tax qualified plan" is because the phrase usually refers to a plan (profit-
sharing, stock bonus, or similar plan) that complies with the requirements of the IRC section 401(a).
Christy & Skeldon, supra note 73, at 724. A plan that complies with section 401(a) of the IRC is
referred to as a "qualified trust" because the satisfaction of that section's requirements "qualifies" the
trust under such plan as "tax-exempt." Id. at 725.
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under ERISA. 128 Rather, they are subject to ERISA on the basis of the
type of benefit that they provide, and therefore, employee benefits practi-
tioners refer to plans as "subject to ERISA," "governed by ERISA," or
simply "ERISA plans," rather than ERISA-qualified plans.129
The court used this article to establish not only that there is no plain
meaning attached to the term ERISA-qualified plan, but additionally that
there is no mention whatsoever of this term in any of the conventional
sources usually visited when dealing with an ERISA plan.130 The court
was thereby assured that it was not missing a statutory established
meaning for the term ERISA-qualified plan and it could therefore move
on to considering case law to aid in its determination of the meaning of
this term. 131
B. CASE LAW INTERPRETATION OF ERISA-QUALIFIED PLAN
The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Shumate may
have intended any one of three interpretations for the term ERISA-
qualified plan.132 First, the Court may have intended the term to mean a
plan that was simply "subject to ERISA."133 Second, the Court may
have intended the plan be subject to ERISA and also contain an
enforceable anti-alienation clause. 134 Finally, the Court may have intend-
ed not only that the plan be subject to ERISA and contain an enforce-
able anti-alienation clause, but additionally, that the plan be tax-qualified
under the IRC section 401(a).135
In determining which interpretation was intended by the Supreme
Court, the court looked to the two lines of cases which have emerged as a
result of similar attempts to ascertain a meaning of the term "ERISA-
qualified plan."1 36 The first line of cases, led by Hall, adopted a
three-prong test in determining the meaning of ERISA-qualified plan
and included the requirement that the plan be tax-qualified under the
128. Craig 11, 204 B.R. at 758. Christy and Skeldon suggest that a qualified plan must fulfill
certain tax requirements in order to be deemed as "qualified," and therefore, because ERISA does not
have requirements like those under the IRC, it is inconsistent to refer to a plan as "qualified" under
ERISA. Id. (citing Christy & Skeldon, supra note 73, at 724-25).
129. Id. (citing Christy & Skeldon, supra note 73, at 724-25).
130. Id. (citing Christy & Skeldon, supra note 73, at 724-25).
131. See id. at 758-60 (considering the two lines of cases that have established different tests for
the meaning of "ERISA-qualified plan").
132. Id. at 758 (citing In re Hall, 151 B.R. 412, 418 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993)). The court only
discussed the second and third interpretations for the term "ERISA-qualified plan" because the first
interpretation is an element in both the second and third interpretations, and additionally, the court had
already determined in the first appeal that Craig's Plans are "subject to ERISA." Id. at 760-61.
133. Id. at 758 (citing Hall, 151 B.R. at 418).
134. Id. (citing Hall, 151 B.R. at 418). The enforceable anti-alienation clause is required by
ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1997).
135. Craig 11, 204 B.R. at 758. (citing Hall, 151 B.R. at 418).
136. Id. at 758-60.
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IRC.137 The second line of cases, led by Hanes, rejected the test adopted
in Hall by rejecting the IRC prong of the ERISA-qualification test. 138
1. The Hall Interpretation of ERISA-Qualified
The district court first looked at the rationale used in the Hall case,
where the bankruptcy court for the Western District of Michigan held
that an ERISA-qualified plan must be subject to ERISA, contain an
anti-alienation provision, and be tax qualified under the IRC.139 The
court identified that in order to conclude that this was the intended
meaning by the Supreme Court, the Hall court had to emphasize some
"seemingly cryptic language" from the Shumate opinion, which
recognized that both ERISA and the coordinate section of the IRC
contain similar restrictions on the transfer of the benefits in the plans. 140
Further, the court recognized that it was precisely this language that the
Hall court relied upon in order to conclude that the Supreme Court must
have intended that ERISA-qualified plans satisfy both the IRC and
ERISA or they would not have cited to both the IRC and tax
regulations. 141
Although the court cited many subsequent cases which adopted
Hall's three-part test for determining whether a plan is ERISA-qualified,
the court pointed to the fact that in none of the cases adopting the Hall
test was the IRC qualification prong a determinative factor in the
outcome of the case; meaning that in these cases a different result would
not have been rendered if the IRC qualification prong had been deleted
from the test. 142 The court emphasized this fact by illustrating that none
137. Id. at 758.
138. Id. at 759.
139. Id. at 758.
140. Id. The "seemingly cryptic" language from Shumate reads:
Section 206(d)(1) of ERISA, which states that "[e]ach pension plan shall provide that
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated,".., clearly imposes
"a restriction on the transfer" of a debtor's "beneficial interest" in the trust. The
coordinate section of the IRC, 26 U.S.C. section 401(a)(13), states as a general rule that
"[a] trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this section unless the plan of which
such mtist is a part provides that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or
alienated," and thus contains similar restrictions.
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 758 (1992). This same section is quoted in part by Hall, 151 B.R.
at 419.
141. Craig II, 204 B.R. at 758 (citing Hall, 151 B.R. at 419).
142. Id. at 758-59. Cases cited by the court that have adopted the Hall three-part test: In re
Orkin, 170 B.R. 751, 754 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (adopting the Hall test but not reaching the IRC
prong because the plans were not subject to ERISA); In re Nolen, 175 B.R. 214, 218 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1994) (adopting the Hall test and concluding that all three requirements were met); In re Foy,
164 B.R. 595, 597 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994) (adopting the Hall test but only addressing the
anti-alienation requirement); In re Lane, 149 B.R. 760, 763-66 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1993) (not expressly




of these courts, when adopting the Hall test, were faced with the scenario
that the plan may not pass the IRC qualification prong of the test, and
thus, would not be ERISA-qualified.143 Further, the court suggested that
this could be a potential problem in Craig's case, making this case one
of first impression.144
2. The Hanes Interpretation of ERISA-Qualified
Second, the court analyzed the rationale used by the Hanes court in
rejecting the three-part Hall test, and instead adopting a two-part test
which requires only that a plan be subject to ERISA and contain an
enforceable anti-alienation provision in order to be ERISA-qualified.'145
Christy and Skeldon, in their aforementioned article, argue that because
section 206(d) of ERISA operates completely independently of the IRC
qualification requirements, and since the IRC does not in itself confer
substantive rights on the participants, a debtor could argue that a plan is
still qualified under ERISA even if it fails to qualify under the IRC.146
This reasoning emphasizes the rationale used by the Hanes court in
adopting their two-part test. 147
The court recognized that subsequent courts have followed the
holding in Hanes and have rejected the IRC prong of the three-part Hall
test for three main reasons. First, the Hanes court articulated that "too
much emphasis [was] placed on the technical requirements of the
[Internal Revenue Code], while failing to place sufficient emphasis on
the Bankruptcy Code," when reaching the conclusion that a plan needed
to be qualified under the IRC in order to be termed ERISA-qualified. 148
The court explained this by illustrating:
143. Craig !I, 204 B.R. at 759. The court states that this "is the scenario this court now faces."
Id.
144. Id. Tax qualification for Craig's Plans under IRC section 401(a) is in some doubt because
the Plans were not promptly amended to comply with the 1984 amendments and certain tax forms
were not filed. Id. At the time of oral argument, the Plans had been submitted to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) Closing Agreement Program (CAP) to determine whether the Plans were tax qualified,
but a decision had not been issued on the application. Id. at 759 n.2. Thus, because the IRS has never
determined that the plans were "not qualified," it could be argued that they are still "qualified" under
the IRC. See In re Baker, 195 B.R. 386, 393 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1996) (holding a plan was tax qualified
because the IRS has never found that the plan failed to be tax qualified). The court was careful to
point out, however, that no matter what the IRS decides with regard to tax qualification, that decision
would not bind this court in a bankruptcy context. Craig II, 204 B.R. at 759 n.2.
The court had not determined whether Craig's Plans were IRC qualified. Id. at 759. The
bankruptcy court determined on remand that the Plans were IRC qualified, but the district court did not
address that determination, instead raising the issue of whether IRC qualification is a necessary
requirement of ERISA-qualification. Id.
145. Craig I1, 204 B.R. at 759 (citing In re lanes, 162 B.R. 733, 740 (Bankr. E.D.Va. 1994)).
146. Id. (citing Christy and Skeldon, supra note 73, at 725).
147. Id.
148. Id. (citing Hanes, 162 B.R. at 740).
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The Bankruptcy Code excludes a beneficial interest in a
trust only when that trust contains an enforceable restriction
on transfer. Thus, the references in Shumate to the IRC simply
acknowledge that the IRC requires, in conjunction with ERISA,
that plans contain non-alienation provisions. It is, however, the
presence of an anti-alienation provision alone that is important
under the Bankruptcy Code, and ERISA independently
requires such provisions and enforces them.' 49
Thus, many courts have recognized that because ERISA requires anti-
alienation provisions, it is unnecessary to require that a plan be qualified
under the IRC in order to be ERISA-qualified.150 Moreover, the court
found that courts adopting the Hanes test emphasized that qualification
under the IRC is required for the purpose of maintaining tax-exempt
status and gaining tax relief, rather than as a necessary factor in
determining the meaning of ERISA-qualified plan.'51
Finally, a couple of courts have adopted the Hanes test and rejected
the Hall test by reasoning that ERISA, not the IRC, provides for the
enforcement of the required anti-alienation provision, and therefore, the
Supreme Court could not have intended tax qualification under the IRC
to be a determinative factor in ERISA-qualification. 152 Using this
argument, the court revisited the "cryptic" language of Shumate and
suggested that the analysis of the Hall court completely ignored the
above facts.153 The court agreed with the Hall court that indeed the
Shumate Court noted that ERISA imposes transfer restrictions and
acknowledged that the coordinate section of the IRC contained similar
restrictions.154 The Supreme Court went on to articulate, however, that
149. Id. (citing Hanes, 162 B.R. at 740).
150. Id. Courts adopting the Hanes test because of this line of reasoning include: In re Bennett,
185 B.R. 4, 6 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1995) (declining the Hall test and instead adopting the Hanes test);
and In re Kaplan, 162 B.R. 684, 691 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (determining that it was not necessary to
ascertain whether the plan was tax qualified in order to determine if the plan was ERISA qualified).
151. Craig 11, 204 B.R. at 760. Two courts have adopted the Hanes test due to this line of reason-
ing. First, S.E.C. v. Johnston cited to numerous decisions which treat "qualification" differently under
ERISA and the TRC. S.E.C. .Johnson, 922 F. Supp. 1220, i225-26 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996). Sec-
ond, In re Watson articulated that "the reason for [an] ERISA-qualified plan is the tax relief which is
the usual inducement. In re Watson, 192 B.R. 238, 242 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1996). Tax deferral ap-
proved by the IRS, as stated by Hall, is necessary to the definition, but the provisions of the IRC section
401 are solely for tax qualification under the [Internal Revenue Code]." Id.
152. Craig 1, 204 B.R. at 760. Anti-alienation plans under ERISA are enforceable because
"ERISA allows a plan participant, beneficiary, fiduciary, or the Secretary of Labor to file a civil
action to 'enjoin any act or practice' which violates ERISA or the terms of the plan." Id. (citing 29
U.S.C. §§ 1 132(a)(3), (5) (1995)). Violations of the anti-alienation clause under the IRC, though
possibly resulting in tax consequences, cannot be enforced because it does not appear that IRC section





"these transfer restrictions are 'enforceable' as required by [the Bank-
ruptcy Code]."155 The court acknowledged that language, which the
Hall court failed to recognize, and suggested that the Supreme Court's
reference to "'[t]hese' transfer restrictions" could only be referring to
ERISA because only ERISA contains enforcement remedies. 156
Before articulating its holding, the court briefly noted that in the
first appeal it was not faced with the decision of applying the Hall test or
the Hanes test because the issue was whether the plans were "subject to
ERISA," a requirement of both tests. 157 In that appeal, the court
reversed the bankruptcy court's decision, determining that Craig's Plans
were "subject to ERISA," and remanded that decision to the bankruptcy
court to determine whether the Plans were ERISA-qualified.15s8 In
remanding this case to the bankruptcy court, the court relied on Hall by
specifying that both the IRC qualification and the existence of an
anti-alienation clause were still at issue. 159
Upon further analysis, the court concluded that the Hanes test
reflects the better reasoned approach, and therefore, as IRC qualification
is not necessary for a plan to be ERISA-qualified, the plans need only be
subject to ERISA and contain an anti-alienation clause. 160 In applying
this holding to Craig's Plans, the court acknowledged that the trustee
conceded that the Plans contain the requisite anti-alienation language
and additionally that the first appeal established that the Plans are
"subject to ERISA."161 Therefore, under the court's determination of
155. Id. (citing Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 758 (1992)).




160. Id. See also Christy & Skeldon, supra note 73, at 725-26 n.25 (stating that it would not seem
reasonable to conclude that the word "qualified" referred to any IRC requirement because the
decision seems to be based on the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA alone). But see Anthony Michael
Sabino and Professor John P. Clarke, The Last Line of Defense: The New Test for Protecting
Retirement Plans from Creditors in Bankruptcy Cases, 48 ALA. L. REv. 613 n.217 (1997) (stating
erroneously that "Chief District Court Judge Webb explicitly followed Hall ... and just as explicitly
rejected the contrary view of Hanes").
161. Craig 1I, 204 B.R. at 760-61. The necessary anti-alienation language can be found at page
58 of Craig's pension plan and at page 56 of his profit-sharing plan. Debtor's Reply to Appellant's
Brief on Appeal at 7, Craig II, (No. 95-30415). As the trustee conceded, there is "no dispute about the
presence of this [anti-alienation] language or that it is sufficient." Id. at 19. See also Appellant's
Brief in Reply to Debtor's Reply to Appellant's Brief on Appeal at'l, Craig II, (No. 95-30415) (stating
that, as the debtor points out, the requisite anti-alienation language is contained in the plan).
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ERISA-qualified, Craig's Plans qualify and are excluded from the
bankruptcy estate. 162
V. IMPACT
The impact of this case, both within North Dakota and across the
nation, has yet to be determined. The attorneys on either side of this
case have different ideas with regard to the potential impact of this
decision.163 Kip Kaler, the attorney for the Appellant, believes that the
impact of the case will be minimal.164 He anticipates that when this issue
is again addressed, it will likely be appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals, as that court has not yet considered this issue. 165 If that is
the case, the impact of this case would prove to be minimal as this
"decision would have no binding effect [on that court]."' 166
Roger Minch, the attorney for the debtor, articulates that the practi-
cal result of this decision is that ERISA-qualified pension plans are
"made more safe from the claims of creditors if there is a bankruptcy
case."' 167 The impact of this result on a nationwide basis, as suggested
by Mr. Minch, is that the public is greatly served by this ruling.168 This
ruling "allow[s] individuals to provide for their own retirements, given
adversities that might arise along the way," and additionally, could help
to relieve "everyone's concern that Social Security and other entitle-
ment programs will not be sufficient."1 69
Although the impact of this case has yet to be seen, it is possible that
the decision reached is in the best interests of all involved. Despite the
fact that the definition serves to exempt property from the bankruptcy
162. Craig II, 204 B.R. at 760-61. Additionally, the bankruptcy trustee made one last attempt to
keep the Plans from being excluded from the bankruptcy estate by making equitable arguments against
such exemption. Id. at 761. The court, however, rejected all of those arguments, and Craig's Plans
were excluded from the bankruptcy estate. Id. A letter from the bankruptcy trustee stated that he con-
tinues to believe that their position (keeping the Plans in the bankruptcy estate) is correct. However,
for practical reasons, no appeal was taken beyond the district court. Letter from Kip Kaler, Attorney,
Kaler Law Office, to Amy Dahl, Staff Member, North Dakota Law Review (Oct. 2, 1997) (on file with
author).
163. Compare Letter from Kip Kaler, supra note 162, with Letter from Roger Minch, Attorney,
Sen!and, Lundberg, E.rickson, ,,,arcil&,- , ,c-an, Ltd., io Amy Dahl, Sialtf iciebr, North Dakota
Law Review (Oct. 2, 1997) (on file with author).
164. Letter from Kip Kaler, supra note 162.
165. Id. (stating that the district court describes that this issue is one of first impression for the
Eighth Circuit). Additionally, Jon Strinden, an attorney hired by Kip Kaler to assist in this appeal,
"expect[s] that in the near future this issue will be clarified by other courts with a determination that a
qualified retirement plan excluded under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code" must fulfill the Hall
test in order to be ERISA-qualified. Letter from Jon E. Strinden, supra note 4.
166. Letter from Kip Kaler, supra note 162.
167. Letter from Roger Minch, supra note 163.
168. Id.
169. Id. Mr. Minch believes that the above articulated impact or significance of this case will be
the same in North Dakota as nationwide. Id.
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estate, this decision enables people, despite some financial hardships, to
provide for their own retirement and thus avoid becoming a social
liability to state and federal governments.
The federal district court for the District of North Dakota deter-
mined that in order for a plan to be ERISA-qualified it must be subject
to ERISA and contain an enforceable anti-alienation clause. If these two
requirements are fulfilled, a plan is ERISA-qualified and will be ex-
cluded from the bankruptcy estate. It will be interesting to watch as addi-
tional courts adopt their own interpretations of ERISA-qualified. More
importantly, however, it is probable that the Eighth Circuit, and ultimate-
ly the Supreme Court, will have to address this issue so that meaning of
ERISA-qualified will be uniformly applied throughout the country.
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